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Introduction 
 
  Following Woodford (1995) a literature has developed under the heading o f the 
‘Fiscal Theory of the Price Level’
2. Under certain conditions
3 the economy is in one of two 
regimes - a ‘Ricardian’ regime where the fiscal authorities act prudently, government debt 
does not constitute an element of net wealth and monetary policy is free to target inflation, 
and another, ‘non-Ricardian’ regime, where fiscal insolvency requires surprise inflation to 
deflate the nominal value of government debt, irrespective of the stance of monetary policy. 
In earlier work (Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)) we relaxed a number of assumptions 
underlying the FTPL, by considering a closed economy with overlapping generations of 
consumers supplying labour to imperfectly competitive firms which could only adjust their 
prices infrequently. This economy also had two stable policy regimes: one where the fiscal 
authorities stabilised their debt stocks and monetary policy was active (using the terminology 
of Leeper (1991)), such that the authorities raised real interest rates when inflation was above 
target, and another where fiscal instability forced the monetary authorities to react ‘passively’ 
to inflation by not raising real interest rates. However both monetary and fiscal policy 
affected inflation under both regimes, and, additionally, both regimes could occur even if all 
government debt was indexed. 
The FTPL has also been extended to two country, open economy models in the case 
of both fixed
4 and flexible exchange rates. Dupor (2000), Daniel (2001) and Loyo (1998) 
consider the fiscal theory in the context of two open economies, trading a single good and 
operating under flexible exchange rates, and seek to address the question as to whether or not 
the FTPL can deliver a determinate nominal exchange rate and price levels in the two 
economies. Dupor (op. cit.) and Loyo (op. cit.) both find that, by allowing one government to 
run a no-Ponzi scheme against the other, there is effectively only one equilibrium budget 
constraint, which is the aggregate of the individual governments’ budget constraints. There 
are, therefore, insufficient equilibrium conditions to define the two price levels and the 
nominal exchange rate between the two economies as part of a non-Ricardian regime. As 
noted by Canzoneri et al (2001), if governments are not permitted to run such schemes then 
                                                                 
2 For a comprehensive survey of the FTPL see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) or Woodford (2001). 
3 The Fiscal Theory assumes that the real level of tax revenues and spending are exogenous such that 
the fiscal authorities do not adjust real surpluses to ensure their budget constraint is satisfied in the face 
of negative fiscal shocks. It is also assumed that all real seigniorage revenues are repaid to consumers. 
The description of the economy is completed with the introduction of an infinitely lived yeoman farmer 
and as a result the  ex ante real interest rate is identical to the representative agent’s rate of time 
preference, and is unaffected by monetary and fiscal policy. Under these conditions, the government’s 
finances are insulated from the effects of monetary policy and, when prices are flexible, the price level 
adjusts to satisfy the government’s budget constraint.    2
essentially each authority faces their own intertemporal budget constraint, which can either be 
satisfied by adjusting tax revenues and government spending in the usual way with monetary 
policy then determining inflation, or through surprise inflation driving a wedge between ex 
ante and ex post real interest rate as in the FTPL. In either case, prices in both economies are 
determined and the exchange rate is then tied down by the usual PPP condition  
  In this paper, section 1 develops a two country open economy model, where - unlike 
the FTPL
5 - each country has overlapping generations of consumers who supply labour to 
imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. Consumers in 
each country purchase differentiated goods produced both at home and abroad. We examine 
the case where the two countries operate under a flexible exchange rate with independent 
monetary and fiscal policies. Section 2 analyses the restrictions on monetary and fiscal policy 
necessary to reach a unique saddlepath-stable rational expectations solution which does not 
involve indefinite transfers of wealth from the consumers of one economy to the consumers of 
the other. Section 3 then calibrates the model and compares the macroeconomic consequences 
of a fiscal shock under the various policy regimes identified in section 2. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1.A Two-Country Model under flexible exchange rates. 
 
The Consumer’s Problem: 
 
A typical home consumer, i, consumes from a basket of consumption goods, derives 
utility from real money balances and leisure. The consumer also faces a constant, 
instantaneous probability of death,  k,  which allows us to write the consumer’s certainty 
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where s is the individual’s rate of time preference and the basket of consumption goods is 











- = ￿   (2) 
Similarly, the consumer price index is given by,  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4Woodford (1998), Bergin (2000), Sims (1999) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2001) consider the case of 
open economies which have entered into a monetary union with a fixed nominal exchange rate and 
common monetary policy, but which still operate independent fiscal policies. 
5 Woodford (1998), also relaxes the assumption of flexible prices in a closed economy model, but 
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Since there are assumed to be no impediments to trade, the law of one price holds for each 











-- - =+ ￿￿   (4) 
where p(z) is the home currency price of good z, p*(z) is the foreign currency price of good z 
and e is the nominal exchange. 
The consumer can hold her financial wealth in the form of domestic government 
bonds, D, foreign bonds, F, and money balances, M. Due to international arbitrage, domestic 
and foreign bonds earn the same nominal return, R, while domestic consumers receive a share 
in the profits of domestic firms,  P. It is assumed that the consumer receives a premium from 
perfectly competitive insurance companies in return for their financial assets should they die. 
This effectively raises the rate of return from holding financial assets by k. Consumer’s pay 
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where a
i
t represents consumer i’s financial assets, which can either be held as domestic bonds, 
as money, 
i
t m  or in the form of foreign bonds, 
*i
t f . Since PPP holds at all points in time, the 
ex ante real rates of return on domestic and foreign bonds will be the same, such that 
*
tt rr = .  
The parameter l  measures the proportion of domestic debt which is nominal, and 
* l  
measures the extent to which foreign debt is unindexed
6. It is only to the extent that interest-
bearing financial wealth is nominal that surprise inflation can erode the real value of financial 
wealth by decreasing the ex post real interest rate relative to the ex ante rate as under the 
FTPL
7. However, in the presence of non-Ricardian consumers and nominal inertia, monetary 
and fiscal policy jointly determine the ex ante real rate, and this can also affect the evolution 
of real government liabilities even if debt is indexed.  
                                                                 
6 These proportions are assumed to be identical across all home consumers and all foreign consumers, 
such that they also represent the proportion of each governments’ bonds which are denominated in 
nominal terms. 
7 In our open economy mode, the surprise inflation applicable to debt denominated in foreign currency 
is foreign consumer price inflation – this captures the loss in return to home consumers arising from 
surprise consumer price inflation in the home economy and any unexpected appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate.   4
The consumer than has to maximise utility (1), subject to her budget constraint (5) 
along with the usual solvency conditions. The various first order conditions this implies are 
given below. Firstly, there is the usual consumption Euler equation, 
  ()
ii
ttt dcrc s =-   (6) 
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If we normalise total population size to one, then it is possible to aggregate across 
generations by noting that the current size of a generation of size k when born at time z is 
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Applying this aggregation to all variables allows us to derive the aggregate domestic 
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where the aggregate financial wealth of domestic consumers is made up of their holdings of 
money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds, 
*
tttt AMDF =++. 
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c =   (12) 
In the foreign country there will be corresponding equations for labour supply, money 
demand and consumption. 
 
The Firm’s Problem: 
 
Given the CES form of individuals’ utility, integrating the demand for good  z across 
consumers and assuming that each government allocates its spending in the same pattern as its 














  (13) 
where y(z), c, c*, g, and g* are defined as real per capita variables. Assuming a linear 
production function, the firm’s (per capita) demand for labour will be equivalent to equation 
(13). 
It is assumed that firms are subject to the constraints implied by Calvo (1983) 
contracts such that at each point in time firms are only able to change prices with probability 
a . Suppose the firm is able to change at this point in time, then its objective function for 
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where the discount rate is raised by the instantaneous probability a  to reflect the fact that this 
price may be in force for some time.  







































  (15) 
The home output price index,  () t ph  is a weighted average of the prices set in the 
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where  t p %  is the price set in accordance with equation (15) by those home producers that were 
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The home government’s budget constraint is given by, 
  (())()
e
tttttttttt dlrlmmg lpppt =----+-   (18)   6
where the total liabilities of the government, l t are made of government bonds held by home 
consumers (dt) or by foreign consumers (
*
t f ), and non-interest bearing money, m t. Aside 
from borrowing and seigniorage, the government finances spending by taxing levying a lump-
sum tax of  t t  of home consumers. Assuming that all government liabilities are denominated 
in domestic currency, there can be a surprise deflation of debt to the extent to which debt is 
indexed to domestic consumer price inflation. 
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2.Compatibility Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy.  
 
In order to analyse the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy it is useful to log-
linearise the model (see Appendix 1), before introducing the description of monetary and 
fiscal policy. We assume that the monetary policy of the both economies involves setting real 
interest rates to target domestic output price inflation
8 so that, 
  ˆˆˆ (1)() ttt rrmh pp =+-   (20) 
and, 
 
* ** ˆˆˆ (1)() ttt rrmf pp =+-   (21)  
where a ‘hatted’ variable denotes the log-linearised variable.  
  Due to the equality of real rates across the economies and the existence of PPP 
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We assume that fiscal policy acts to stabilise the liabilities of each fiscal authority 
independently, and we follow Sims (1997) in formulating a simple rule as follows,  
  1 tot l tff =+  (24) 
                                                                 
8 An alternative would be to target consumer price inflation. However, work by Clarida et al (2001) 
suggests that targeting domestic inflation is optimal in models where the main friction is in domestic   7
This rule can be log-linearised as,  
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 in the home economy and, 
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in the foreign economy. 
 
Necessary Conditions for Saddle-Path Stability: 
 
In our model, it is not possible to a priori divide policy into ‘Ricardian’ or ‘non-
Ricardian’ regimes since at all points in time monetary and fiscal policy jointly determine the 
values of real and nominal magnitudes in our economies. However we can examine the 
conditions under which various monetary and fiscal policy combinations can deliver 
saddlepath stability. In other words we can identify the conditions under which policy will 
generate a unique path for prices under rational expectations and ensure that both countries’ 
stocks of financial assets and liabilities return to their steady-state values following a 
temporary shock.  
To undertake this stability analysis it is helpful to represent our economies as a 
dynamic system in matrix algebra form. This can be achieved quite easily as follows. First of 
all, note that the global market clearing conditions allow us to eliminate one of our financial 
asset/liability variables from the system described in Appendix 1, since it is determined as a 
residual of the other three. We choose to drop 
* ˆt a , although the choice is immaterial. Similarly 
we can eliminate 
* ˆt y  from all equations using the condition for market clearing in the goods 
market. Finally, noting that the definition of consumer prices implies that 
111 ˆ ()()
222
tttt Pphpf e =++
) ))
 it can be seen that home firm output (66) depends upon 
aggregate demand and the real exchange rate, which can be defined as, 
ˆ ˆˆˆ ()() tttt ephpf e =-++ . Therefore, any terms in domestic output can be replaced with a 
combination of the real exchange rate and the components of aggregate demand,
* ˆˆˆ ,, ttt ccg  and 
* ˆt g , although we also need to add an equation describing the evolution of the real exchange 
rate,  
  ˆ ˆˆˆ ()() tttt dehfd ppe =-++   (27) 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
price setting. Additionally, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2002) show that simple rules of this form can lead 
to indeterminacy when excess inflation is defined in terms of consumer price inflation.    8
This can then be rewritten using the UIP condition, to give, 
 
* ˆˆˆ ()() ttt demfmh pp =-+   (28) 
By adding the description of policy outlined above, we can represent the two economies in 
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=+ and xgc tc =-+ . 
The constraints on policy required to ensure a dynamically stable economy are clearer 
if we assume that the economy approaches its cashless limit
9 (as in Woodford (1998)) i.e. 
0 c ﬁ . This has the implication that the central bank retains control over nominal interest 
rates, but that the contribution of seigniorage revenues to government finances are negligible. 
Woodford (op. cit.) shows that this cashless economy retains the essential features of the 
FTPL and this is confirmed for a closed economy with sticky prices and non-Ricardian 
consumers in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).  
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A necessary condition for stability is that the determinant of this matrix be negative, since we 
require three eigenvalues with negative real parts (corresponding to the pre-determined 
                                                                 
9 Even if we allowed for seigniorage revenues, for plausible values of  c the stability conditions shown 
here are not materially affected. These more complex conditions are available from the authors upon 
request. The numerical analysis that follows this section allows for non-zero values of c .   9
variables
10,  ˆt a ,  ˆ
t l  and 
* ˆ
t l ) and five eigenvalues with positive real parts relating to the ‘jump’ 
variables in the system ( ˆt e ,  ˆ() t h p , ˆ() t f p , 
* ˆt c , and  ˆt c ).  
  The first thing to note is that the expression within the square brackets labelled (i), is 
unambiguously negative and does not contain any of the parameters within the policy rules
11. 
Therefore in assessing the determinant condition for stability we need only consider the 
expression within the second square brackets, labelled (ii), which must be negative as a 
necessary condition for saddlepath stability. In this context saddlepath stability implies that all 
variables in the system will return to the steady-state following a temporary fiscal shock – on 
plausibility and welfare grounds, we do not consider the possibility of one government 
indefinitely accumulating the debt of the other.  



















  (29) 
 
where ‘a’ and ‘z’ are defined above, and are always positive. The inequality involves all four 
policy parameters. The term in (
**
11 2r ff +-) introduces the possibility of ‘compensation’ 
between fiscal policy makers in each country, and the term in (
* mm + ) does the same for 
monetary policy. Note that as the probability of death tends to zero, the steady state real 
interest rate tends to the rate of time preference, so the last term in (47) becomes unimportant, 
and also z tends to zero, so the term involving the sum of the two fiscal parameters drops out. 
This shows that the possibility of compensation between policy makers in different countries 
arises because consumers are non-Ricardian, so that changes in debt have macroeconomic 
demand effects which spill over from one country to another. 
  We c an rewrite this inequality as two sets of inequalities which are conditional on 
various combinations of policy parameters as follows, 
                                                                 
10 It should be noted that the initial values of real government liabilities and private sector assets, may 
be influenced by any surprise inflation if they are denominated in nominal terms. However, since they 
are not themselves free to jump to any level to eliminate the influence of unstable eigenvalues on the 
dynamic system they should not be considered to be ‘jump’ variables. 
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* ()0 mm ><  and 
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  (31) 
 
* ()0 mm ><  and 
*
11 ()()()0 rr ff --<>  
 
The first set of inequalities defines a mix of policy regimes analogous to Leeper’s (1991) 
active/passive characterisation of monetary/fiscal policy, but extended to the case of two 
countries operating under flexible exchange rates. Note that as the probability of death tends 
to zero, only the first set of inequalities is possible. The second inequality only arises with 
non-Ricardian consumers. Accordingly, the second set of inequalities can be thought of as 
‘corrections’ to these definitions which apply when consumers are non-Ricardian. To see the 
various policy regimes these inequalities imply more clearly it is helpful to represent them 
diagrammatically as in Figure 1.  
The two hyperbola trace out the combinations of fiscal policy parameters for which 
the expression labelled (ii) is zero, conditional on the values the structural parameters and on 
the monetary policy parameters
12. The axes correspond to  1 r f -  and 
*
1 r f - , the two fiscal 
policy parameters, and the various zones imply the combinations of mm* that are required to 
ensure stability. The shaded areas shows those zones implied by the first inequality, (30), 
while the non-shaded zones are those which exist only because consumers are non-Ricardian 
(the second inequality, (31)).  
 
                                                                 

















   
are positive, which seems likely, although the analysis below is not significantly altered if the opposite 
is true.   11 
Figure 1 – Compatability Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
 
 
  Consider the case where both fiscal authorities pursue strong debt stabilisation, so 
both  1 r f - and 
*
1 r f - are large and positive. In this case, from the inequalities in (30), 
* mm  
must be positive. Although the inequality can hold if both  m and 
* m were negative, we have 
found from examining eigenvalues under plausible parameter values that this combination is 
never stable. (Recall that (29) is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for stability.) Thus 
in this case both monetary authorities have to be active. This is the counterpart to Ricardian 
policy regimes in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, and the active policy regime in Leith 
and Wren-Lewis (2000). As the probability of death rises, the hyperbola defining this zone 
shifts to the Northeast. This shows how non-Ricardian consumers increase the required 
degree of fiscal feedback. 
  The intuition behind this last result is straightforward. Consider a positive debt shock 
in one country. With Ricardian consumers, we simply require fiscal feedback to be marginally 
more than the steady state (=actual) real interest rate to prevent a debt interest spiral (see 
Sims, 1999). However, with non-Ricardian consumers, higher debt generates additional 
demand, putting upward pressure on inflation in both countries. With active monetary policy, 
this raises real interest rates in both countries. We have a debt interest spiral which is 
intensified by non-Ricardian consumers generating higher real interest rates. For stability, 
1 r f -
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fiscal feedback must now reduce debt by significantly more than the steady state real interest 
rate, because actual real rates are above steady state levels. 
  The hyperbola in the Northeast quadrant also implies that there is some scope for a 
fiscal authority in one country to ‘compensate’ for a relatively weak fiscal response in another 
country and thereby enable both monetary authorities to pursue an active inflation-targeting 
monetary policy. However, such compensation is only feasible to the extent that both fiscal 
authorities operate in the shaded area in the Northeast quadrant. 
  Staying with the first inequality in  (30), we can see that if just one fiscal authority 
conducts weak or no debt stabilisation (e.g.  1 r f < ), then stability requires one monetary 
policy to be passive (i.e.  0 m <  or
* 0 m < ). These are the shaded zones in the Northwest or 
Southeast quadrants, and correspond to a mixed Ricardian/non-Ricardian regime. Lack of 
fiscal feedback in one country is compensated for by a passive monetary policy in one 
country. In effect, monetary policy in one country acts to neutralise the potentially unstable 
debt-interest spiral created by lack of fiscal feedback. Again consider a positive debt shock in 
one country. This will generate higher inflation, and a debt-interest spiral. However if one 
monetary policy maker is passive, higher inflation will lead to lower real interest rates, 
counteracting the debt-interest spiral.  
  An important feature of this result is that the passive monetary policy does not need 
to occur in the same country as the weak fiscal feedback. In  (30),  1 r f < can be stable if 
* 0 m <  and  0 m > . The possibility that a passive monetary policy in one country can 
‘compensate’ for lack of fiscal feedback in another is explored further in numerical 
simulations below. 
  The final  possibility implied by the first inequality in  (30) is t hat both fiscal 
authorities fail to stabilise debt strongly ( 1 r f < and 
*
1 r f < ). This implies 
* 0 mm > . As was 
the case with  1 r f > and 
*
1 r f > , we have found from examining eigenvalues that the 
possibility that both  m and 
* m are positive in this case is always unstable, so stability 
requires both monetary policies to be passive. In other words, this quadrant is equivalent to a 
non-Ricardian regime in both countries. 
  As consumers become almost Ricardian, these four zones tend to become identical to 
the four quadrants. The second inequality  (31) arises because consumers are non-Ricardian, 
and is delineated by the non-shaded areas in the diagram. Consider the non-shaded area in the 
Northeast quadrant first. Here, although both fiscal feedback parameters,  1 f  and 
*
1 f , exceed 
the steady-state real rate of interest, they are insufficiently large to prevent a debt interest 
spiral emerging when debt constitutes an element of net wealth due to existence of non-
Ricardian consumers. As a result,  one monetary policy must be passive. Thus the mixed   13 
regime analysed above for fiscal feedback parameters of opposite sign is extended into areas 
where both  1 f and 
*
1 f  parameters are positive but small.  
  The final  case occurs in the  non-shaded areas of the  Northwest and S outheast 
quadrants. Here one fiscal parameter can be very negative, but the other fiscal parameter is 
small but positive. In this case both m parameters must be of the same sign, and numerical 
analysis suggest they must both be negative. Thus this area extends the rectangle in the 
Southwest quadrant into a hyperbolic region which is the ‘reflection’ of the hyperbola in the 
Northeast quadrant.  
  In summary we can identify three basic regimes which describe feasible combinations 
of monetary and fiscal policy. In the first regime, both fiscal authorities respond strongly to 
debt disequilibrium and this allows the monetary authority in each economy to actively target 
inflation. In the second regime, one fiscal authority continues to implement a sustainable 
fiscal policy, while the other does not seek to stabilise its outstanding stock of liabilities 
sufficiently strongly to prevent a debt interest spiral in the absence of an accommodating 
monetary policy. An important feature of this regime is that it does not matter which 
monetary authority abandons the active targeting of inflation in order to stabilise the debt of a 
recalcitrant fiscal authority. The final regime is where neither fiscal authority acts to stabilise 
its debt stock, and both monetary authorities have to abandon the active targeting of inflation 
to stabilise the debt stocks of their respective fiscal authorities. The distinction between these 
regimes depends crucially on the degree of non-Ricardian behaviour on the part of consumers. 
The wealth affects implied by non-Ricardian consumers typically raises the degree of fiscal 
feedback required to stabilise the debt stock given that the monetary authorities are pursuing 
an active monetary policy. 
 
3.Calibration and Simulation of the Model: 
 
  In order to discuss the policy implications for different degrees of fiscal rectitude 
under alternative monetary policies, we need to adopt parameter values for our model. We 
calibrate our model as a description of the US/Euro area block. We assume that a unit of time 
corresponds to a quarterly data period. Accordingly, the parameters we choose are given in 
Table 1, along with the steady-state values these imply.  
   14 
Table 1 – Parameters and Steady-State  
Parameter  Value  Variable  Steady-
State 
Value 
Steady-State Value as 
percentage of annual 
GDP 
q  8  yN =   0.5  100% 
s   0.007  r (annualised)  0.03  N.A. 
k  0.0092  h   22.5  1123% 
t   0.125  al =   1.2  60% 
a   0.287  c   0.37  77% 
k   1.136  g   0.115  23% 
c   0.001  m   0.05  2.7% 
 
The value of the elasticity of demand facing our imperfectly competitive firms,  q , comes 
from the econometric work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). The continuously 
compounding quarterly discount rate of  0.007  is consistent with an annualised equilibrium 
real interest rate of 3%, given the mark-up implied by non-Ricardian consumers. The k 
parameter is the probability of death for our consumers. This value implies that consumers 
have an expected working life of 27 years. Although this may be thought to imply an 
implausible value for the probability of death, it is necessary to generate a plausible steady-
state value of government debt relative to GDP (see below). t is our basic level of income tax 
and is set at  0.125 which implies a n  average  income tax rate of  25% of GDP. The k  
parameter is chosen such that, in steady-state, households devote, on average, 50% of their 
waking hours to leisure and 50% to working.  While the parameter  a  measures the 
instantaneous probability that a firm will be able to reset its price. Therefore, 
1
a
 measures the 




= , means that it takes, on 
average, 10.5 months for firms to reset prices. This figure is consistent with an average of the 
econometric estimates of this parameter for the Euro area and the US in Gali et al (2001) and 
Leith and Malley (2001)
13. Finally, we assume, that the parameter governing the importance 
of money in utility is 0.001, implying that the stock of government liabilities issued in the 
form of cash or deposits is 2.7% of GDP. Again these figures are consistent with the Euro 
area at the end of 2000 (ECB (2001)) and are not out of line with data for the US. This 
                                                                 
13 An interesting area for future research would be to consider the implications for asymmetries in the 
two economies, especially differing degrees of nominal inertia.   15 
parameterisation, therefore allows a small role for seigniorage revenues in the analysis that 
follows. 
  The steady-state these parameters imply is shown in the right-hand-side of the table. 
The real interest rate has an annualised value of around 3%, and the steady-state ratio of debt 
to GDP is around 60%, which is consistent with figures for the US (US Govt (2002)) and 
Euro area (ECB (2002)) economies. The ratio of government spending to GDP of just under 
25% is also typical of both European and the US economy if you eliminate transfers from the 
definition of government spending to be left with government consumption as defined in our 
model (see Gali (1994), for a comparison of t his ratio across OECD economies). In 
conducting our simulation analysis we also need to make assumptions about the composition 
of the initial stocks of public sector liabilities/private sector assets. Initially, we assume that 
all government debt is nominal, is denominated in the currency of the respective fiscal 
authority and that 21% of that debt is held abroad. This is line with the composition of 
government debt in the US where very little debt is denominated in foreign currency and the 
extent of indexation of the outstanding debt stock is similarly insignificant, and is not an 
unreasonable description of the Euro-area economy
14. However, in the simulations that follow 
we analyse the implications of relaxing these assumptions.  
  We can now consider the implications of our stability analysis given the assumed 
parameters of our model in the case where both monetary authorities actively target inflation 
with a common coefficient on excess inflation in the two countries’ interest rate rules of 
* 0.5 mm == (as suggested in Taylor (1993)). The parameter values suggest that if both 
fiscal authorities ran policies such that  1 0.0079 f >  and 
*
1 0.0079 f >  (i.e. for every one Dollar 
of debt disequilibrium taxes have to adjust by at least 0.0079 Dollars) then the monetary 
authorities would be free to actively target inflation. If one fiscal authority failed to meet this 
level of fiscal feedback then the other may be able to compensate for their behaviour, 
although only in the range of 
*
1 0.00770.0079 f << , such that the monetary authorities could 
still run an active monetary policy. In other words, although there is the theoretical possibility 
of one fiscal authority compensating for the lax fiscal behaviour of another, the range over 
which this is possible is very small, and could require a very large fiscal response on the part 
of the compensating authority. Since the minimum degree of fiscal feedback required of each 
authority is relatively low it seems far more likely that the only sustainable policy space is 
where both fiscal authorities act to fulfil this condition leaving the monetary authorities free to 
target inflation.  
 
                                                                 
14 34% of Euro area debt is held abroad, (ECB (2002)) but that includes intra-European holdings so that 
the US figure of 21% debt held abroad (US Govt (2002)) does not appear to be unreasonable.   16 
Simulations:  
 
In this section we analyse the paths of aggregate variables in our two economies in 
the face of shocks under various descriptions of policy. The shock we consider is a fiscal 
shock which raises the real value of debt by 10%, cet. par.  
Initially, we assume that policy makers behave symmetrically in both economies 
with, 
* 0.5 mm == in line with the standard parameterisation of Taylor-type rules (see 
Taylor (1993)) and 
*
11 0.1 ff ==. This description of fiscal policy implies that each fiscal 
authority raises taxation by 0.1 Dollar for every 1 Dollar of debt disequilibrium. Simulating 
our two-economy model with these policy rules, suggests that although consumers are non-
Ricardian, and discount the future far more heavily than an infinitely-lived consumer would, 
the fiscal shock still has a negligible impact on consumption and inflation due to the active 
response of monetary policy. The initial (and greatest) impact on inflation in both economies 
is only 0.008%, with consumption only rising by 0.005%. The small inflation response to the 
fiscal shock means t hat surprise inflation has a very limited impact on the stock of 
outstanding liabilities and so whether debt is real or nominal is relatively unimportant. 
  We can then contrast these simulations with an example where country 1 operates an 
active monetary p olicy,  0.5 m =  alongside a fiscal policy which seeks to stabilise the real 
debt stock,  1 0.1 f = , while the monetary authorities in country 2 are forced to abandon their 
active monetary policy, 
* 0.5 m =-  in order to compensate for the refusal of their fiscal 
authorities to adjust tax revenues in order to stabilise the debt stock, 
*
1 0 f = . Figure 2 reveals 
the paths for the same set of variables considered above, as well as the real exchange rate, 
since this is no longer constant as a result of the asymmetrical policy response across the two 
economies, when debt is both nominal and real. Although the exchange rate is flexible and 
country 1 follows the same set of policies as described above, the impact of the same fiscal 
shock on inflation and consumption in both economies is far more significant – annualised 
output price inflation rises by almost 6.6% in country 2 on impact, while falling to –2.5% in 
country 1, as the asymmetry in the conduct of monetary policy generates real exchange rate 
changes which reduce demand and, therefore, inflation in country 1. From equation (23) we 
see that the net effect of monetary policy in the two economies is to reduce real interest rates 
(which are equalised across the two economies due to the presence of PPP) and this brings 
consumption forward in time, such that consumption rises by 5% and 6.3% on impact in 
countries 1 and 2, respectively. However, the path for consumption is higher in country 2 
throughout the simulation. The reason is that the large appreciation of the real exchange rate 
as a result of the relatively  active monetary policy in country 1, means that, due to the   17 
nominal inertia in price setting, output falls in country 1 relative to consumption and 
consumers in country 1 are forced to borrow from abroad to maintain consumption. The 
converse is true in country 2. It should be noted that, in contrast to  the OR model, this 
consumption differential will not last forever, and the economies will eventually return to the 
unique steady-state
15.  
Figure 2 also considers what happens when debt is denominated in real terms. In this 
case the initial jump in inflation does not serve to reduce the real value of government debt in 
country 2 (debt in country 1 is not deflated since the active monetary policy induces a large 
exchange rate appreciation which reduces consumer prices in country 1 relative to country 2) 
and the passive monetary policy in country 2 has to reduce real interest rates by more in order 
to return the debt stock to equilibrium. This increased role for the monetary authorities in 
Country 2 in stabilising indexed debt typically doubles the disequilibrium consquences of the 
fiscal shock 
  The next simulation we consider is where the fiscal authorities in country 2 still do 
not react to debt disequilibrium, 
*
1 0 f = , but where their monetary authorities pursue an 
active monetary policy, 
* 0.5 m =  In contrast the fiscal authorities in country 1 still act to 
stabilise their real stock of debt,  1 0.1 f = , but the monetary authorities pursue a  passive 
monetary policy,  0.5 m =- . The  paths for relevant endogenous variables are detailed in 
Figure 3. Here we confirm a key result in the analysis of section 2 – namely that the monetary 
authorities in country 1 can compensate for the lax fiscal behaviour in country 2. An 
important implication of this policy, revealed in the simulation, is that country 1 now suffers 
the higher rate of inflation as a result of their passive monetary policy. However, the real 
exchange rate depreciation this induces allows them to accumulate net foreign assets and 
maintain consumption at a higher level than their neighbours for a sustained period. The 
passive monetary policy in one economy acts to stabilise the debt stock in another country by 
reducing real interest rates in both economies. The rise in output price inflation in country 1 
and the ongoing appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, feeds consumer price inflation in 
country 2, which will reduce real interest rates, cet. par. This, in turn, reduces debt service 
costs in country 2 and stabilises the debt stock. The main problem with this policy, however, 
is that the passive monetary policy in country 1 induces a large exchange rate depreciation 
which means that there is no surprise increase in consumer prices in country 2 and no initial 
debt deflation. Instead, the policy deflates debt in country 1 where a stabilising fiscal policy is 
already in place and so this is of little consequence. Accordingly, exchange rate movements 
                                                                 
15 However, our simulation results suggest that with near Ricardian behaviour on the part of consumers, 
this can take around 100 years in this particular case.   18 
imply that using monetary policy to deflate debt is best achieved from within the same 
economy. 
  These results suggest that a global economy made up of responsible monetary and 
fiscal authorities has little to fear from fiscal shocks. However, when one fiscal authority does 
not act to stabilise its debt stock, then there must be offsetting behaviour from a monetary 
policy maker to avoid an unsustainable debt interest spiral. We have shown that there is no 
reason for the compensating monetary policy makers to reside in the same country as the 
recalcitrant fiscal authorities – a foreign monetary authority can also engineer the reduction in 
domestic debt service costs through their influence on the import component of home country 
consumer prices. However, the costs of using monetary policy to stabilise debt will be greater 
when the debt is denominated in the currency of an active monetary authority, since this limits 
the size of the initial debt deflation due to offsetting exchange rate movements. Similarly, 
indexing the debt stocks also reduces the stabilising effects of surprise inflation and requires a 




  In this paper we derived a two country open-economy model where over-lapping 
generations of consumers, consumed a basket of domestically and foreign-produced goods 
and supplied labour to the imperfectly competitive firms producing these goods. These firms 
were assumed to only be able to alter their prices after a random interval of time, so that 
monetary policy could have real short run effects. This allowed us to examine a model where 
the range of fiscal and monetary policy interactions were wider than normally considered in 
open economy extensions of the FTPL.  
  We identified the restrictions on fiscal policy required to support the active targeting 
of inflation on the part of the monetary authorities. A key result was that minimum 
responsiveness of tax revenues to debt disequilibrium required to support an active monetary 
policy was greater when consumers were non-Ricardian. Additionally if any fiscal authority 
did not meet this minimal requirement then there was limited scope for the other fiscal 
authority to compensate. In the absence of such behaviour, the monetary authorities would 
have to operate a passive monetary policy which offset any debt disequilibrium by reducing 
debt service costs. However, in a model featuring free trade, where output price inflation in 
one economy affects consumer prices in the other, there was no reason for the passive 
monetary authority to reside in the same country as the insolvent fiscal authority. 
Finally, in a series of simulations we demonstrated that when all the fiscal authorities 
adjust taxes to stabilise their real debt stocks, then fiscal shocks will have a limited impact on 
macroeconomic variables such as output and inflation. In contrast, when one monetary   19 
authority abandons its active policy to assist an otherwise unstable fiscal authority, then the 
macroeconomic impact of a fiscal shock can be sizeable. The costs of such a policy are, 
however, lessened to the extent that initial price and exchange rate movements serve to 
deflate the real value of the debt of the recalcitrant fiscal authority through surprise consumer 
price inflation, and this is achieved when the debt is nominal and denominated in the currency 
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Appendix 1 – Log-Linearising around the Steady-State 
 
Equation (15) shows that the optimal price in a zero-inflation steady-state, which is 








  (46) 
Combining this with the labour supply condition, the linear production function and the 
national accounting identity (in the symmetrical steady-state the current account will be in 
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c =   (50) 
Note that in this symmetrical equilibrium, with PPP due to free trade, it will also be the case 




= . This 
fact, combined with equations (47)-(50), will determine the steady-state value of real assets in 










  (51) 
Since consumers are not infinitely lived, the real interest rate is not identical to consumers’ 
rate of time preference, but will be affected by the outstanding stock of government liabilities, 
since these liabilities constitute an element in consumers’ net wealth. 
 
Log-Linearising the Model: 
 
  We now proceed to log-linearise the model around the symmetrical steady-state. To 
illustrate this consider the labour supply equation,   22 
  (1) ttt wNc k -=   (52) 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides, differentiating with respect to time and evaluating 
this expression at the symmetrical steady-state yields, 
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This approach can be applied to all the equations in our model. We now focus on the 
derivation of the key dynamic equations in our system. 
  First, consider the linearised expression for the optimal price set by a home firm, 
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Log-linearising the expression for the index of home country output prices gives, 
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Differentiating with respect to time twice, utilising (55) and substituting the linearised labour 
supply function into this expression yields,  
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  Now consider the domestic government’s budget constraint in terms of real total 
government liabilities, 










= . Log-linearising, utilising the definition of the steady-state and 
noting that with ‘independent’ monetary policies the fiscal authorities will only receive the 
seigniorage revenues generated by their own monetary authorities, gives, 









  (59) 
  In our open economy the evolution of private sector financial assets in the home 
country is given by,   23 
  (1) tttttt daracy ct =-++-   (60) 
which can be log-linearised as, 









  (61) 
Any increase in the level of the financial wealth of the private sector relative to the liabilities 
of the government implies an increase in holdings of foreign government debt given the 
global market clearing condition in the bond market,  
 
** ˆˆ ˆˆ tttt aall +=+  (62) 
Differentiating the consumption function (10) with respect to time, 
  ()() ttt dckdadh s =++   (63)  






=--+ ￿￿ , and 
() ttttt dhrkhyt =+-+ . Using the equations of motion for human and non-human wealth 
allows us to rewrite the equation of motion for consumption as, 
  (()(1))() tttt dcrkkckka scs =+-++-+   (64)  
This can be log-linearised as, 
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  Further, since consumption is not synonymous with output in the open economy, we 
need to consider the definition of average firm output, 
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alongside the global goods market clearing condition, 
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Similar expressions exist for the foreign economy.  
  Finally we have the UIP governing the dynamics of the exchange rate,  
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16 The lines with diamonds indicate the paths of variables when government debt is indexed to each 
country’s consumer price inflation. Lines without diamonds apply when debt is nominal. Solid lines 
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Figure 3 – Monetary Policy in Country 1 Compensates for Insolvent Fiscal Policy in Country 
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